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ome eighteen months after the first 
Greek rescue (May 2010), there is little 
doubt that the multiple attempts at 
crisis management in the eurozone have 
failed to restore confidence. Indeed, 
following each round of emergency 
measures agreed by the eurozone summits, 
matters have turned for the worse (see 
Figure 1 for the widening spreads, over the 
German Bund, for sovereign borrowing in 
the eurozone). At the time of writing, 
contagion has spread beyond Spain and Italy 
to the core sovereigns, with France close to 
losing its triple A rating and even Germany 
experiencing partial failure in a Bund 
auction on November 23rd. Spreads are also 
opening up for Austria, Belgium, Finland 
and even the virtuous Netherlands. 
Meanwhile, the banking system Europe-
wide is under increasing strain, with term 
funding all but closed for any bank with 
significant exposure to distressed sovereign 
debtors and the interbank market close to 
seizing up. Deposit withdrawals have 
surfaced in a number of large banks from the 
periphery. The euro has started to weaken in 
foreign exchange markets, narrowing the 
room for a distinction between eurozone 
debt crisis and euro-currency crisis from 
which some observers were until recently 
drawing comfort. 
These developments once again raise 
fundamental questions: What is not 
working? Why is it that dramatic changes in 
our policies and institutions within the 
eurozone are failing to halt the meltdown of 
confidence? Answers are needed, and 
needed soon – because the breakdown of the 
eurozone now appears a concrete possibility 
if we continue along this path. Rather than 
dwell on the details of specific interventions, 
I will concentrate in this essay on the 
fundamental questions, and disagreements, 
before us. Essentially my argument is that 
political disagreements, rather than any 
fundamental economic disturbance, are 
leading us down a very slippery slope.  
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Figure 1. 10-years government bonds spread vs. German bund, 1 December 2009 – 23 November 2011 (%)* 
 
Notes: [1] May 2010: Adoption of the first financial assistance package for Greece and establishment of 
the European Financial Stability Fund; [2] 18 October 2010: Deauville agreement between France and 
Germany destabilises financial markets; [3] 24-25 March 2011: European Council agrees on a new 
economic policy package; [4] 21 July 2011: Eurozone leaders reach an agreement on a new rescue 
package for Greece and the EU crisis management framework; markets are reassured and sovereign 
spreads fall; [5] 26 October 2011: Eurozone governance stepped up at the euro summit .  
* Daily data. 
 Source: Financial Times on Thomson Reuters.  
Reform policies under way 
One important strand of opinion, notably in 
Germany and other northern European 
countries, maintains that the culprit is lax fiscal 
policies and excessive debt accumulation by 
some eurozone member states. Greece, for one, is 
defaulting on its debt obligations, despite very 
harsh corrective measures – albeit its plight has 
been aggravated by its economy, as a 
consequence, going into free fall and its political 
system coming under close-to-unbearable strain 
to keep to the austerity course. But the numbers 
are small and would not endanger the solidity of 
Europe’s banking system even under extreme 
hypotheses of debt restructuring. 
Ireland, Portugal and Spain have adopted or are 
about to adopt public-sector consolidation 
measures that have earned good marks from the 
European Commission, the European Central 
Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). Indeed their sovereign interest rate 
spreads over the German Bund were all receding 
– dramatically so for Ireland – up until the latest 
round of meetings by the euro summit at end-
October (Figure 1). 
Last summer, sovereign selling pressures have 
expanded into Italy, which has a relatively small 
public sector deficit – about 4% of GDP in 2011 – 
but a debt-to-GDP ratio of close to 120%. The 
government tried to play for time but heavy 
selling pressures convinced it to bring forward 
budgetary balance to 2013. The limelight of 
market concerns then shifted to the adverse 
composition of the consolidation measures, 
largely based on higher taxes, and the absence of 
market opening and growth-enhancing measures 
– which raised doubts about the long-term 
sustainability of the public debt stock, given 
Italy’s endemic dismal growth and productivity 
performance. Since Berlusconi’s coalition was 
unwilling or unable to do what was asked for, 
they were ousted from government – once again 
under heavy selling pressures, with the spread 
over the Bund climbing to close to 600 basis 
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points. The new ‘national unity’ Monti 
government, which was sworn in with lightning 
speed, has received (for now) broad 
parliamentary support to do all that is needed to 
restore sound government finances and to 
reform the Italian economy. The spread over the 
Bund has receded but it remains near 500 basis 
points, as markets await the new government’s 
decisions. 
True, the currency union has permitted, or even 
encouraged, lax financial policies – with 
Germany and France carrying large 
responsibilities, having suspended in 2003 the 
excessive deficit procedure that should have 
been opened on themselves. These policies later 
came to haunt all of us as financial markets re-
priced sovereign risks. However, budgetary 
consolidation seems well underway in all 
‘sinning’ countries together with long-awaited 
structural reforms. As may be seen from Figure 
2, based on IMF forecasts to 2016, after 
increasing in the aftermath of the 2008-09 
financial and economic crisis, sovereign debts are 
now expected to stabilise at manageable ratios to 
GDP in all of the eurozone countries except 
Greece – even though slow growth will not allow 
for rapid reductions. In sum, all available 
information points to a situation that is coming 
back under control.  
 
Figure 2. Public debt in selected countries, 2011 and 2016 (% of GDP) 
 
Source: IMF 2011. 
Stronger economic governance in the 
eurozone 
Meanwhile, economic governance in the 
eurozone has been strengthened to unthinkable 
heights as regards both substance and 
enforcement procedures. The Broad Economic 
Policy Guidelines of Article 121 TFEU are now 
assisted by legally binding enforcement 
procedures, while the European Semester 
ensures ex-ante coordination of economic policies 
and time-consistent decision-making processes 
in the member states and the European Council. 
The excessive deficit procedure has been 
reinforced in both its preventive and corrective 
arm, and now includes fresh constraints on the 
growth of public expenditures and operational 
criteria for public debt reduction. And there is a 
new procedure, also legally binding and assisted 
by sanctions, for the correction of ‘excessive 
economic imbalances’, explicitly targeting 
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competitive imbalances and their underlying 
causes. The Euro-Plus Pact details the enhanced 
policy commitments of eurozone member states 
for budgetary stability, structural reforms and 
market opening. Eurozone members are required 
to strengthen their budgetary frameworks with 
the adoption of multi-year planning, top-down 
decision-making procedures and independent 
evaluation agencies; many members have even 
indicated their intention to introduce balance-
budget rules into their constitutions.  
The European Commission has been given 
independent powers to signal emerging 
deviations from agreed policy guidelines, and to 
make recommendations to the Council on the 
opening of formal procedures, down to the 
phase of sanctions, that the Council can only 
reject or weaken with ‘reverse’ qualified 
majorities. A new proposed Regulation just 
announced will require eurozone member states 
to present their draft budgets at the same time 
each year and, before national parliaments 
decide on them, give sufficient time to the 
Commission to assess them and, if need be, ask 
for revisions when it considers that the draft 
budget violates the Stability and Growth Pact. 
Some still consider these improvements 
insufficient and would like even stronger 
safeguards against policy slippages, possibly 
including the attribution of direct executive 
powers to eurozone bodies (to be identified) to 
modify policies within national domains. And 
yet, even leaving apart legitimate preoccupations 
on the progressive expropriation of national 
sovereign powers – which at some stage will 
clearly require the establishment of new 
legitimising controls at eurozone or Union level 
by means of treaty changes – there is little doubt 
that we now live in a different world where 
policy constraints on the member states of the 
eurozone are effectively binding, owing also to 
the added coercion of heightened financial 
markets scrutiny. 
And yet, market pressures, far from abating, still 
seem on the rise – while at the same time not 
affecting countries with large deficits and rapidly 
rising debt outside of the eurozone, such as the 
US and the UK, not to mention Japan, which has 
a mountainous public debt, close to 200% of 
GDP, but no problems in placing its paper on the 
markets. It is difficult, similarly, to understand 
why is it that within the eurozone many 
countries with a smaller debt/GDP ratio than 
Germany – such as Austria, Finland or the 
Netherlands – must pay a positive spread over 
the Bund on their government issues.  
All in all, one cannot avoid the conclusion that 
the eurozone suffers from some special disease 
that makes financial markets fret even if policies 
seem everywhere on the right track. Of course, if 
this were indeed the case and there was a special 
disease, it is also possible that financial markets 
m a y  b e  f o r c i n g  u s  o n t o  a  p a t h  o f  e x c e s s i v e  
deflation, which may eventually frustrate all 
efforts at budgetary consolidation – Greece 
docet.1 With this warning enters the euro or, 
rather, the way we manage our common 
currency. 
The foreign currency syndrome 
The fundamental difference between a country 
that is a member of a monetary union and a 
country that has its own currency is that the 
former needs the permission of an institution 
that it does not control to increase liquidity – say 
to compensate for an outflow of liquidity 
through the banking system or to stabilise the 
government bond market – while the latter does 
not. To each of the monetary union members, for 
all practical purposes, the euro is like a foreign 
currency, since no one enjoys access to the euro 
printing press. As a consequence, eurozone 
member states are exposed to currency runs that 
are triggered when confidence in the ability to 
meet foreign-currency obligations is shaken by 
an exogenous shock or by unconvincing policies. 
Such a system can switch rapidly from ‘fair 
weather’, where foreign currency risks are 
underpriced, to ‘bad weather’ where risks 
become overpriced. In the second scenario, the 
explosion of financing costs can make fears of a 
run self-fulfilling. 
Switching from ‘fair weather’ to ‘bad weather’ is 
not an entirely unpredictable event. A further 
feature of the monetary union is that one 
monetary policy must fit all – regardless of 
divergent prices and wages, productivity, public 
spending and taxation, and market openness. 
When a country with higher inflation and 
structural rigidities joins a monetary union, it 
typically finds itself awash with liquidity, since 
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real interest rates become negative and credit is 
cheap. Of course, the real exchange rates will 
then appreciate and business competitiveness 
will suffer, leading to rising unemployment; but 
abundant credit will encourage the postponing 
of adjustment and preserve inefficient jobs with 
public money. Public spending will rise and the 
public-sector deficit will widen, while politicians 
will thrive on distributing subsidies and 
protection to broaden electoral consensus. 
Lax financing conditions may prevail for quite a 
long time, as financial markets continue lending 
to divergent countries to gain higher nominal 
returns. But sooner or later the process is bound 
to come to a halt, as growing external and 
public-sector deficits come to be seen as 
unsustainable. And then one day, typically as a 
consequence of some exogenous shock, investors 
flee, liquidity evaporates and the divergent 
country finds itself unable to refinance its debts 
in private markets at acceptable prices – as 
happened to Greece and Portugal.  
A variant of the model is one in which the 
economy in the divergent country experiences a 
real estate boom and rapid economic expansion, 
leading to unsustainable private indebtedness, 
while the public sector seems in good health. But 
again, at some stage the real estate boom must 
end and, when house prices start falling, many of 
those private debts cannot be serviced, to the 
point where financing institutions also come 
under the threat of insolvency. Then the 
government may feel obliged to step in and 
rescue the banks: so that unsustainable private 
indebtedness is turned into dangerously high 
government debt – as happened to Ireland and 
(to a lesser extent) Spain. 
Thus, lax and divergent national policies do 
carry responsibility for the sudden switch in 
confidence. However, financial markets do not 
adjust smoothly but rather by jumps, and they 
tend to overshoot. Even countries that did not 
run divergent policies or, at any rate, maintained 
manageable exposures in ‘fair weather’, may find 
themselves unable to manage them after the shift 
to ‘bad weather’. 
These events lead to a reassessment of 
outstanding risks for the entire union, with an 
extra ingredient: namely, the fact that national 
banking systems have in the meantime become 
highly interconnected – with ‘core’ country 
banks extending excessive credit to divergent 
country banks and governments. Thus, any 
doubts on the sustainability of sovereign 
obligations in divergent countries are readily 
transformed into doubts on the sustainability of 
the banking system in the core, stable countries.  
Confidence in financial markets is a fickle 
commodity that can evaporate quite rapidly 
unless investors can be reassured that a liquidity 
crisis will not be allowed to develop into a 
solvency crisis for one member after another of 
the monetary union. This is precisely what has 
happened in the eurozone since Greece was first 
bailed out in May 2010. 
Liquidity support and debt restructuring 
A confidence crisis spreading contagion even to 
the ‘sound’ part of a monetary union can be 
stopped by abundant supply of liquidity by the 
central bank or by a common fund performing 
the same service, with policy conditionality, with 
resources lent by the central bank or raised in 
capital markets. In all likelihood, both are 
needed in some appropriate combination. Failure 
by the euro summit to agree on a strong and 
effective rescue fund has stiffened the ECB, 
which fears that losses on its holdings of 
distressed sovereigns may one day force it to 
turn to national governments for capital, and 
thus lose independence.   
However, two stumbling blocks have so far 
impeded adequate liquidity support.   
The first one is the fear that liquidity will reduce 
pressure on ‘sinners’ to adjust. All assertions that 
the sinners are now mending their ways, under 
much strengthened common economic 
governance arrangements, have so far failed to 
convince – even if, as I have recounted, policies 
have turned in the right direction everywhere. 
Some will not be satisfied until the union is 
assigned direct powers to intervene and change 
national policies, when these deviate from their 
policy commitments. However, everyone should 
be aware that even the best policy course will 
need time to produce its effects; in the meantime, 
adequate financing flows must be maintained, or 
adjustment policies will fail to prevent a 
currency run. 
The second ingredient in the unfolding drama is 
the intermingling of liquidity support and fiscal 6 | STEFANO MICOSSI 
 
transfers, which inevitably arises if some of the 
countries under life support become insolvent 
and thus require debt restructuring. In this 
regard, Germany is adamant that liquidity 
support can never entail fiscal transfers – which 
would breach the ‘no bail-out’ provision of the 
Treaty (e.g. Article 125 TFEU) – and has on this 
account maintained strong pressure on the ECB 
to limit its open market operations in support of 
distressed sovereigns.  
In reality, if adjustment works, there is no reason 
why liquidity support should be turned into 
fiscal transfers. To the extent that confidence is 
hit by fears of insufficient liquidity, the simple 
act of restoring adequate liquidity would stop 
the run and make insolvency, and the need for 
fiscal transfers, unlikely. On the other hand, if 
there is a collapse of liquidity, fiscal transfers 
may become inevitable at least to rescue own 
(German) banks, following the chain-collapse of 
all other sovereign debtors in the union.    
Germany has also insisted that the private sector 
should share the burdens of any debt 
restructuring. As a result of disastrous 
communications, private sector involvement 
(PSI) has become a promise of losses on all 
outstanding eurozone sovereign exposures, 
without sufficient differentiation. Thus investors 
have started to dampen most eurozone 
sovereigns; even Germany has been affected. A 
cursory look at Figure 1 will confirm that 
contagion really started following the Franco-
German announcement in Deauville that PSI 
would be part of any financial assistance 
programme, in October 2010. 
 
Two further jumps in the spreads are clearly 
associated with the July and October 2011 
meetings of the euro summit, as the 
announcements of rising ‘haircuts’ on Greek debt 
combined with inadequate liquidity support for 
the other distressed debtors in convincing 
investors to get away from eurozone sovereigns 
as rapidly as possible. 
In conclusion  
The eurozone has proven so far collectively 
unable to ring-fence the Greek problem and to 
raise credible liquidity walls around the other 
distressed sovereigns. Meanwhile, the costs of 
adjustment in divergent countries are ballooning 
thanks to rising interest rates and falling activity, 
heralding further budgetary cuts and further 
deflation. The euro summit has to go back to the 
drawing board and overcome its political 
disagreements on how to proceed. Straitening 
policies in all the member states will not suffice; 
there is also a need for an adequate provision of 
liquidity – as large as needed to stop the ongoing 
currency run. If this cannot be agreed upon, the 
eurozone will break down, with gigantic 
economic dislocations. 
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